POTENTIAL COMPETITION AND POSSIBLE COLLUSION IN FOREST SERVICE TIMBER AUCTIONS
Abstract
Potential competition significantly affects the size of winning bids in Forest Service sealed‐bid timber auctions and has little effect on winning bids in oral auctions. Winning sealed bids depend even more, however, on actual competition, a result suggesting collusion. This explanation is supported using an index representing the likelihood an auction was rigged. Preclusive bidding (a type of collusion) in oral auctions is indicated by a positive relationship between hauling distances and the size of winning sealed bids. Comparisons of winning‐bid variances, overbids, and numbers of bidders across auction type support this explanation of oral auction prices.
Reference
Lance Eric Brannman. (1996). POTENTIAL COMPETITION AND POSSIBLE COLLUSION IN FOREST SERVICE TIMBER AUCTIONS. Economic Inquiry. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1996.tb01407.x
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